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Abstract: Ad hoc issue coalitions allow advocates to pool resources and signal support of 
their position to policymakers. Ad hoc coalitions, however, are not formed in every 
instance; groups do not always choose to ally since there are also costs associated with 
membership.  To understand why organizations sometimes decide to ban together and 
sometimes choose to forge ahead alone, I argue we must consider the institutional 
structure of the political system; the nature of the issue at hand; and finally the 
characteristics of the interest group itself. This theory is tested on original data based on 
interviews with a 149 lobbyists active on a random sample of 47 policy issues in the 
United States and the European Union. The results show that EU advocates are building 
formal coalitions at a much lower rate than their American counterparts. The qualitative 
evidence suggests that the democratic accountability of policymakers may explain these 
differences.  
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Introduction 
Nearly every scholarly work on lobbying mentions networking of one type or another 
(Heclo 1978; Sabatier 1988; Salisbury et al. 1987). Advocates share tidbits of information 
after committee meetings, forward emails with talking points, hold conference calls to get 
allies up-to-speed on policymaking developments, send joint letters to policymakers; all 
of these activities can be referred to as networking or coalition activity.  
  Networking ranges on a continuum from very informal and loose, comprised of 
occasional information sharing, to highly coordinated enterprises with logos, letterhead 
and secretariats. Almost without exception, all lobbyists engage in some degree of 
networking; not all advocates pursue more formalized ad hoc issue coalition action.  
What determines how coordinated like-minded advocates choose to be? What 
factors lead advocates to work in more formal ad hoc issue coalitions rather than simply 
share information informally through loose networks?  This paper seeks to answer these 
questions by analyzing original data based on 149 in-depth interviews with advocates in 
Washington D.C. and Brussels lobbying on a random sample of 47 policy issues in the 
United States and the European Union.  
Previous studies of lobbying in both the U.S. and the EU have demonstrated that 
advocates (whether interest groups, corporations, or institutions) sometimes choose to 
work on their own (Salisbury 1984; Coen 1997), sometimes pursue their lobbying goals 
through their associations or federations (McLaughlin, Jordan & Maloney 1993; Pollack 
1997; Bouwen 2002; Walker 1991), and other times opt to work through a hired lobbying 
firm (McLaughlin, Jordan & Maloney 1993; Bouwen 2002; Lahusen 2002). Ad hoc issue 
coalitions constitute another alternative.  It is important to better understand this   4
alternative route advocates use to advance their positions since coalition action may have 
differential effects on interest group influence and since different types of interests may 
be benefiting from the strategy (see Mahoney & Baumgartner 2004). Do advocates join 
ad hoc issue coalitions when they face a particularly difficult fight? Do they join when 
they have the resources available to contribute to the collective? Are citizen interests 
more likely to ban together than corporate interests?   Numerous studies look at certain 
aspects of ad hoc coalition activity, but the focus has largely been confined to the US 
case, and little research has sought to determine the effect of institutional design on 
coalition activity.  This paper seeks to fill this void. It does not attempt to determine if 
coalitions are more influential than other forms of interest representation, but rather aims 
to determine what contextual factors lead advocates to choose the issue coalition route to 
influence public policy.   
The first section of the paper reviews the literature on interest group activity in 
coalitions. This section includes a definition of “ad hoc issue coalitions,” as well as a 
discussion of why they are important to interest groups participating in the policymaking 
process. The second section identifies three sets of factors that appear to play a role in the 
decision of advocates to join issue coalitions and lays out the theoretical expectations 
about how these three groups of factors should influence formal coalition activity. The 
third section explains the research design and data.  The fourth and final section presents 
the empirical analysis of the factors influencing coalition activity.  
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Previous Research on Interests Groups in Coalition  
As mentioned, networking is ubiquitous. Lobbyists need information on policy proposals, 
intelligence on policy developments, and knowledge of the positions of other advocates 
active on a policy debate. Much of this can be gathered from simply talking with other 
lobbyists and thus some level of networking is expected on every issue. 
But the question remains: why move beyond networking to build more formal ad 
hoc issue coalitions?  By ad hoc issue coalitions I mean a very specific type of coalition 
of groups – one which forms for a single discrete issue fight. Pijnenburg (1998) notes that 
ad hoc issue coalitions are characterized by low levels of formalization (compared to 
formal interest group organizations) and high levels of autonomy for the coalition’s 
members. They are established in the short to medium term for the duration of a single 
legislative or regulatory debate. While some issue coalitions may last longer, they remain 
a coalition of autonomous groups, they do not establish their own direct membership or 
organizational structure. There is usually a coalition leader organizing the efforts of the 
members, regular meetings of the coalition members, joint lobbying actions such as joint 
letters, advertisements or press conferences and very often an official name for the 
coalition and even letterhead and a secretariat acting as the headquarters of the coalition 
(Berry 1989). Ad hoc coalitions are most often composed of different types of groups or 
associations representing different sets of interests.  The concept of ad hoc issue 
coalitions should not be confused with Sabatier’s (1988) concept of “Advocacy 
coalitions” which is a much broader theoretical construct than a discrete set of groups that 
have organized themselves for a single issue fight.     6
Groups could choose to work alone, or through their federation, or through a hired 
lobbyist but the ad hoc advocacy coalition offers unique advantages. From the literature it 
is clear that coalitions can be beneficial to interest groups in a political fight in two 
regards: 1) The coalition can signal to policymakers that a policy position has the support 
of a large and varied group of interests; and 2) The coalition can provide a framework for 
more efficient use of resources.  
Scholars from Mayhew (1974) to Kingdon (1995) to Esterling (2005) have 
suggested that policymakers look for signs that a policy proposal has broad support. In 
political systems where policymakers are elected, they will want to know whether a vote 
in favor of a provision could prove later to be detrimental to them in an election. If a 
large majority of the public is opposed to a proposal which a policymaker supports, he or 
she could pay for it in the next election (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990).  Thus coalitions 
can signal to policymakers where the bulk of support lies. Coalitions can also indicate 
that advocates have worked out differences among themselves before approaching 
government officials and thus their final position is one that can be supported by a the 
majority of the legislature and the public (Heclo 1978; Hula 1995, 1999).  A coalition can 
thus garner more political support for a policy position by indicating a large set of 
interests already support the position.  
From a resource efficiency standpoint, coalitions have the potential to pool the 
resources of their members, and thus coalition activity could be more economical. As 
Hojnacki notes “almost all discussions of interest group coalitions refer to resource 
sharing as a benefit of coalition advocacy (Berry 1977, 1989; DeGregorio and Rossotti 
1995; Hula 1995; Ornstein and Elder 1978; Scholozman and Tierney 1986)” (cited in   7
Hojnacki 1998, 439). Some tactics like running issue advertisements can be very 
expensive, but if everyone in the coalition contributes some funds it lightens the burden 
on any one advocate. Moreover, if coalition members divide up the lobbying work among 
them they can more efficiently use the resources of the collective in the given policy 
fight. In addition, joining a coalition can be a relatively low-cost tactic and a rational 
lobbyist may incorporate this one tool along with many others in their advocacy strategy 
(Coen 1997; Pijnenburg 1998). 
Since coalitions send cues to policymakers about the desirability of a policy 
option and since they pool scarce resources, advocates have an incentive to join them. 
However there are also costs associated with coalition membership; some money and 
time need to be devoted to the coalition and a group may need to modify their position on 
an issue to be inline with the coalition position.  In addition, groups in crowded advocacy 
communities have an incentive to differentiate themselves from other interest groups in 
order to attract membership (Browne 1990).  In short, there are also forces pushing 
groups to work alone. Thus we would expect groups to join coalitions in instances where 
there is a greater need than usual to signal to leaders the breadth of support for a position 
and a greater need to pool resources.  
Previous research on ad hoc issue coalitions has addressed many questions about 
the behavior of advocates within coalitions but less about why groups join them initially.  
Hojnacki (1998) investigates when US groups in coalition free-ride and when they decide 
to be active contributors to the collective effort (for a similar study see Heaney 2004). 
Hula (1995) also looks at why some US groups become coalition leaders while others are 
members in name but devote very few resources. He argues that groups that constitute the   8
“core” of the coalition are those with the most at stake, while those in the “periphery” are 
only tangentially interested in the policy outcome.  
Some studies have looked more directly at why advocates join coalitions. Hula’s 
(1999) later work lays out a range of resource incentives that coalitions present to 
potential members – the traditional monetary resources, but also informational resources 
and political contact resources. He argues that resource sharing is an incentive that 
attracts members to a coalition even though they may need to modify their position to be 
included in the coalition. Pijnenburg’s (1998) exploratory case study in the EU leads him 
to similar conclusions about the importance of resource incentives, specifically the 
provision of insider information and how the “insider” status of some coalition members 
can be shared with other members.  
Hojnacki (1997) models the decision to join a coalition as a cost-benefit analysis. 
Her evidence shows that US groups will not join a coalition when the costs of joining the 
coalition outweigh the potential benefits that the coalition might provide. Holyoke (2004) 
models the decision of advocates to join an ad hoc issue coalition as a bargaining process 
in which two advocates are in conflict and they can choose to cooperate and work toward 
a new policy position that pleases them both (through coalition building) or they can 
choose to engage in an advocacy war. The bargaining model suggests advocates’ 
decisions to be very much influenced by the decisions of their potential coalition partner/ 
competitor.  Coen’s (2004) work also highlights the importance of other actors in the 
advocacy community as well as institutional pressures when considering the rise of ad 
hoc coalitions in the EU environmental domain in the 1990’s. He notes that competition   9
among groups for sought after access to restricted policy forums drove business interests 
to ally and even modify their positions to gain entrance.  
 
Institutions, Issues and Interests: Factors Influencing the Decision to 
Join an Advocacy Coalition 
As the preceding section has shown, previous studies of ad hoc issue coalitions have 
considered the importance of a number of issue characteristics (i.e. conflict, importance 
of issue, position of other actors on an issue) and some interest group characteristics (i.e. 
resources, issue positions) on coalition membership, but there has been little research on 
the effect of institutional design on coalition formation. This omission is understandable 
since most studies of coalition activity are restricted to a single political system. 
However, a comparative research design opens the door to exploring this question.  
Following Kingdon’s (1995) approach to understanding political phenomena, I work 
toward a more holistic model, recognizing that various streams of factors merge to 
determine the decision to join a coalition.  Specifically, I argue that three critical streams 
of factors must be taken into consideration: the institutional structure in which the 
advocate is operating, the nature of the policy issue at hand, and characteristics of the 
interest group.  
  At the institutional level, I hypothesize that the democratic accountability of 
policymakers is a key institutional factor when we seek to understand the decision to join 
a coalition. As discussed above, ad hoc issue coalitions have two advantageous qualities: 
they pool resources and they signal to policymakers the breadth of support for a policy 
position. All things equal, advocates should have some base level of attraction to   10
coalitions since they efficiently pool resources, but that attraction should increase in 
political systems where policymakers are highly attuned to cues about public support for 
policy proposals, as they are when they are directly elected.  
While there is variation on the level of democratic accountability within the EU, 
with the EP being more democratically accountable then the Commission and Council, 
the EU institutions are largely not democratically accountable to the people – as is often 
lamented on the large literature on the democratic deficit (Weiler et al. 1995; Follesdal & 
Hix 2006).  In addition, the democratic accountability of the EP, which is directly elected, 
is greatly reduced due to the use of party lists by the member states during EP elections 
(Kreppel 2001).  Furthermore, Princen and Kerremans note that the EP “is largely 
shielded from direct popular control because EP elections are usually decided on 
domestic themes and popular interest in the EP’s work remains low between elections” 
(2005, 8).  In the US on the other hand, members of both the House and Senate are highly 
aware of their electoral vulnerability and are thus highly accountable to the people in 
direct elections. Thus, a comparative US/EU study can provide some insight into the role 
of democratic accountability on coalition activity. Of course, there are other differences 
between the two systems in addition to the differences in democratic accountability, thus 
qualitative and interview-based evidence will be used to assess if accountability is a 
likely factor in explaining any observed differences in coalition activity.  
  When policymakers are directly accountable to their constituents they should be 
more susceptible to claims about the broad support of interests for a specific proposal. 
Thus, we should expect more ad hoc issue coalitions to form in the US than in the EU. 
This is in line with Bouwen’s (2002) work that argues that information on encompassing   11
interests (which coalitions provide) are less desired by the European Commission than 
expert knowledge (which coalitions do not have a competitive advantage in producing) 
since the Commission is the primary target of lobbying in the EU.  
  There are, of course, other system differences that could account for differences in 
the prevalence of coalitions in the two systems. First, the EU system is characterized by 
multilevel governance. It could be that while ad hoc issue coalitions may not form at the 
EU level (the focus of this study) they may be forming in the member-state capitals. 
National-level lobbying remains a significant focus of European interests (Kohler-Koch 
1994; Beyers 2002; Imig & Tarrow 2001). Second, EU groups may have less resources to 
devote to an ad hoc coalition. While Brussels has long been making important public 
policy, some industries, sectors and interests still find it difficult to encourage their 
national organizations to contribute significant amounts of funding to the EU level. Some 
Eurogroups may simply not have the resources at their disposal to pass up to another 
level of organization.  Third, there could be a difference in the composition of the interest 
group communities in the US and the EU – with the US having many more smaller 
specialized groups and the EU having more encompassing umbrella organizations. The 
smaller specialized groups in the US would have more reason to ban together than larger 
Euro-federations of national associations. To parse out which of these factors, or 
combinations thereof, are most likely at play, I will rely on qualitative data from in-depth 
interviews in addition to quantitative data.  
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Issues & Interests 
The characteristics of the issue at hand should also determine whether a coalition is 
established on a given policy debate. First, highly conflictual issues may more likely lead 
to coalition formation because conflict gives groups an incentive to band together to face 
a common threat (Gais and Walker 1991; Hojnacki 1997; Whitford 2003). Advocates 
need to signal the strength of their position relative to their competitors to elected 
officials following the case. Thus, it is expected that the higher the conflict among actors 
on the issue, the higher the probability of coalition membership. Second, highly salient 
issues are also expected to lead to coalition formation since these types of issues require 
that advocates demonstrate a broad base of support. In addition, issues that are the object 
of a great deal of public attention may require advocates to engage in more costly tactics 
such as issue advertisements or publicity raising events and thus pooling resources may 
be even more attractive on such costly issues. Third, the scope should play a role. Larger 
scope issues that affect large portions of the population can be costly since advocates may 
need to convey their position to the affected public. In addition, large-scope issues, which 
will have significant implications for large sections of the electorate, should drive groups 
to signal their strength to policymakers through allying in a coalition. Thus, the 
expectation is that the larger the scope of the issue, the higher the probability of coalition 
membership. 
  Some authors have suggested some types of organizations are less likely to 
engage in coalition activity than other types of advocates. Clark and Wilson (1961) 
suggest that cooperation is more likely among utilitarian groups and less likely among 
purposive groups, largely because the latter are more restricted in their activities due to   13
incentive systems (1961, 162). The idea here is that the added benefit of signaling and 
resource pooling do not outweigh the ideological cost of potentially having to modify 
one’s position to fit with the coalition. Thus actor type should play a role in the decision 
to join a coalition, with the expectation that ideological citizen groups should be less 
likely to align.  
Organizational resources should play a role in the decision to work through a 
coalition. Resource mobilization theorists emphasized the importance of resources in 
interest group mobilization and advocacy efforts (McCarthy & Zald 1978; Cress & Snow 
1998). In order to mobilize for a policy debate, resource-poor groups need to identify 
resource sources and spend resources conservatively. Since coalitions pool resources, 
coalition activity could stretch scare resources. Wealthy advocates on the other hand, 
such as trade associations and corporations, do not face the same type of hurdles to 
mobilize. As an issue rises on their agenda, resource-rich advocates can more easily 
mobilize for the debate without having to rely on like-minded interests. Indeed this may 
be the cause for Caldeira and Wright’s findings in their study of amici curiae activity 
which showed public firms and peak associations to be less likely to work in coalition 
(1990, 799).   I use staff size as a proxy for resources and test whether organizational 
resources influence the decision to join a formal coalition. Since coalitions pool 
resources, the expectation is that resource-poor groups will be more likely to join 
coalitions.  
 
Research Design and Data   14
To test the effects of institution, issue and interest factors on the decision to join a ad hoc 
issue coalition the project presented here collected data on a random sample of actors, 
lobbying on a random sample of cases in the two political systems of the US and the 
EU
1. A random sample of American lobbyists was drawn from a sampling frame of all 
Lobby Disclosure reports registered in 1996 (see Baumgartner & Leech 2001). A random 
sample of EU lobbyists was drawn from a sampling frame I developed through 
combining the 2004 Registry of the European Parliament, the 2004 Commission registry 
of civil society organizations (CONECCS) and the 2004 European Public Affairs 
Directory.   
Advocates who agreed to be interviewed were asked to describe the issue on 
which they had most recently been working.  This served to generate a true random 
sample of issues, rather than the largest, most interesting or most important issue to the 
organization.  This data collection process led to a random sample of 21 issues in the US 
and 26 issues in the EU
2. In addition, interviewees were asked to identify the other major 
actors engaged in the policy debate who were then interviewed, forming the snowball 
portion of the sample.  
Respondents were also asked about the background of the issue they were 
working on, the tactics they engaged in, coalition participation, the arguments they were 
employing, among other questions.  For each advocate interviewed, I coded if they were 
members of any ad hoc issue coalitions, the names of those coalitions, and if any other 
coalitions were engaged in the policy debate of which they were not members. 
  In addition to data collected through the in-person interviews I also collected 
information on the issues and the individual organizations.  Small-scale case studies were   15
conducted on each of the issues based on news coverage and official government 
publications. This research was the basis for the coding of the issue variables of Scope 
and Conflict. Salience was measured by news coverage of each issue collected through 
Lexis-Nexis searches. For the US cases, salience is indicated by the number of New York 
Times articles on the issue in the two year period of research, and for the EU cases 
salience is indicated by the number of Financial Times articles.  
 
Empirical Findings 
As expected more ad hoc issue coalitions were formed in the US than the EU. Across the 
sample of 21 US issues a total of 22 ad hoc issue coalitions were established. In the EU, 
only 5 coalitions were formed across 26 issues. Some issues prompted multiple coalitions 
to form like the Transportation Reauthorization issue in the US on which 7 ad hoc issue 
coalitions formed or the Packaging and Packaging Waste issue in the EU for which 2 
coalitions mobilized. Looking at the number of issues in the US and the EU on which one 
or more coalitions formed, shows 57% of US issues with coalition activity while only 
15% of EU issues exhibit coalition activity, as seen in Figure 1a.   
[Figure 1 A & B about here] 
Looking at it at the advocate level, in the US 19 of the 65 advocates interviewed, 
or 29%, joined ad hoc coalitions established on the issue at hand.  In the EU, only 8 of 82 
advocates or 9.8% of advocates reported joining an ad hoc issue coalition as seen in 
Figure 1b.    
The majority of issues in the US have coalitions organizing on them, while 
coalition activity in the EU is quite rare. However, not every advocate in the US is opting   16
to work through coalitions on every issue, 70% of US advocates are not joining coalitions 
on some issues. The nearly ubiquitous nature of coalitions across the 22 issues in the US 
sample suggests that a leader often forms a coalition, making the lobbying route available 
to advocates active on the issue. Whether the coalition then become one of the most 
important actors, or whether prominent advocates work through it however appears to be 
a different story. The data makes clear though, at either the issue or individual level, the 
rate of coalition activity remains much higher in the US than the EU.  
  The simple differences between coalition activity in the US and the EU are not 
enough to determine if electoral accountability is driving the difference or if another 
factor explains these system level differences. However, the hypothesis that advocates 
active in a system with greater electoral accountability will be more likely to work 
through coalitions does find qualitative support in addition to the quantitative evidence 
presented above.  
In the US, a number of lobbyists active in coalitions describe the attempt to 
convey the breadth of support for their position. A company lobbyist on the CAFÉ debate 
described a coalition of which they were a member: 
The Coalition for Vehicle Choice is a very broad group – there are auto companies in it, 
the suppliers are in it, the dealers are in it, but it also includes some of the safety 
organizations that are concerned about highway safety and some of the consumer groups 
like, the Snowmobile Association, the recreation industry has been involved in this as 
well. So we’ve tried to be as creative and broad – reaching out to other groups – as we 
could be. 
Similarly, a trade association lobbyist on the marine employment issue tried to convey 
the breadth of the coalition she was leading: “In the coalition, we have over a 100 people   17
in the coalition, all different types of people, the marine related people, people from the 
insurance industry – we thought they would have a problem with it, they’ve actually 
joined the coalition.”   
  In addition to conveying the sheer size of support, it can be equally important to 
convey to elected policymakers that different types of organized interests are on board. 
Some have referred to coalitions which have traditionally opposing interests allying on a 
certain issue as “strange bedfellow coalitions.” These are instances such as the extreme 
left and the extreme right agreeing on free speech issues; or leftist human right groups 
and conservative religious groups agreeing on foreign policy proposals against oppressive 
regimes. In the US sample, strange bedfellow coalitions could be found between business 
and the environmental community. Advocates active on such coalitions emphasized the 
power of such alliances. A trade association lobbyist on the Wind Energy Tax Credit case 
explained: “That’s good when you can get disparate parties signing on to a letter, a 
Member of Congress sees a letter and it’s signed by the Chamber of Congress and the 
Sierra Club, how often do you see that?”   
The aim then is to build as big and as broad of a coalition as possible. In this way 
advocates can signal to elected policymakers that a large majority of the electorate will 
likely support them, if they support this proposal. This electoral signaling in effect says to 
elected officials: vote for this without concern for negative political consequences.  
  There is also evidence that pooling resources is part of the decision. While 
coalitions are in part about sending signals to policymakers they are also about resource 
efficiency. A citizen organization active on the issue of disability rights in the welfare 
program described how the members of the CCD tried to stretch their resources by   18
divvying up meetings with Members of Congress. A member of the Basic Education 
Coalition painted a similar picture of trying to magnify the impact of the coalition 
members. She explained how coalition members pooled resources to finance a trip for 
Members of Congress to education projects in developing countries. Thus in the US we 
see strong evidence that coalition building is about sending a ‘big and broad’ message to 
elected officials, but stretching resources is also a goal.  
  In the EU, the few actors that reported coalition activity focused more on resource 
sharing, rather than conveying the sheer breadth of support. As one of the members of the 
coalition on the Consumer Credit Directive explained the aim was to share information 
and work out the details of their position before they approached policymakers: 
We set up last year the EBIC – the European Banking Industry Committee – and that has 
as members ourselves, the European Banking Federation, the European Savings Bank 
Group, and some others, it is a kind of platform, the aim is to find our convergences, and 
once we do the outcome is the drafting of letters to the Commission to the EP.  
  Similarly a trade association active on the packaging environment indicator in the 
Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive described how the goal of the coalition was to 
work out technical details: 
We are really, I don’t want to say the authority, but the major player when it comes to 
packaging. Now each of the major sectors, or materials also have their own organizations 
– beverage has its own, plastic, paper, and each has its own sub-section dealing with 
packaging and some resource devoted to that. We work in coalition with them…So in 
those we exchange ideas, make sure we are all singing from the same hymn sheet.  
Finally, a member of the coalition on solvent producers and users on the Clean Air for 
Europe issue emphasized that coalitions are more about hashing out the details and   19
exchanging information than sending a political message. He noted that they met 16 
times a year to debate the current problems and decide on a common position.  
In further evidence of the resource pooling and not political signaling aim of 
coordinated activity in the EU, advocates reported high levels of networking. Though 
they may have not needed to convey the magnitude of their support, and thus did not 
need to establish an ad hoc issue coalition, advocates active on the CAFÉ, REACH, Data 
Retention, and Animal Transport debates all engaged in highly organized networking. A 
trade association on the Data Retention issue explained: “We decided to work closely 
with the other E-associations, so EUROISPA, GSM Europe, ECTA – the smaller 
telecoms companies, we did a lot of lobbying, we wrote letters, we did a lot of 
information gathering and sharing.”  The coordination of industry on the CAFÉ debate 
was nearly surgical in its precision, organized at the top by the pan-EU business 
association UNICE. Each of the lobbyists described divvying up tasks, sharing 
information and working in synchronization; as one trade association explained: 
I can’t possibly attend all the meetings. But we are always represented by UNICE, there 
is always one member of the working group at the meetings and then they share that and 
we circulate documents around. UNICE has a small working group set up on CAFÉ and 
it meets fairly often, once a month, and so we stay up to date that way… And UNICE is 
sending a letter to all the Commissioners, and we divide it up in the working group, so 
electricity has good contacts with DG Energy and so they will work on them, and we will 
talk with Enterprise, and it goes like that.  
  If the aim was to signal to policymakers the breadth of their support it may have 
made sense to form an official ad hoc issue coalition, with a catchy name, and send out 
countless letters advertising their large and diverse membership. As it was, their aim was   20
resource efficiency and they therefore organized their work and resource pooling behind 
the scenes.  
Highly professional networking isn’t reserved for industry alone. An 
environmental organization active on REACH described how the green EU groups 
worked to coordinate their activities: 
We all try to coordinate as much as possible so as to not step on each others toes and also 
to enhance our work because each can do a different part. Also, each likely only has one 
person working on this, so that isn’t that many people really, and they also have other 
issues they have to cover, compared to CEFIC, they have like 140 people here spending 
about 100% of their time on REACH.  
  While policymakers in the EU may be less responsive to coalition 
communications because of their limited electoral accountability, one of the alternative 
explanations – that the advocacy communities in the US and the EU are composed of 
different types of actors, more specialized in the US, broader in the EU  – also finds some 
support.  Since EU umbrella organizations are alliances of national associations, they 
already represent a number of organizations and thus don’t find it necessary to ally with 
other interest groups. As one industry lobbyists succinctly put it: “We are the entire 
industry, so we don’t really work with any other organizations.” A trade association 
active on the REACH debate conveyed a similar logic: “Since we are an umbrella 
organization of 50 national and sectoral associations we are in a way a coalition.”   
  It is difficult to discount the other two alternative hypothesis – regarding 
multilevel governance and resource scarcity in the EU – but no evidence for them 
emerged from advocates’ discussions of their coalition activity.  I did ask advocates if 
they were also pursuing the national route as part of the larger project from which this   21
data stems and none of the 82 lobbyists mentioned an ad hoc issue coalition which was 
established in any of the member states. A larger study that would specifically collect 
data on coalition activity at both the national and European level would be needed to 
accurately assess if this factor plays a role in lack of coalition formation in Brussels. 
Many actors in the EU did mention lack of funds, and the inability of their constituent 
members to see the importance of contributing money for representation in Brussels, but 
much the same complaints could be heard from the US lobbyists. Even the largest lobbies 
consistently feel their industry, sector or membership do not invest enough in their 
government relations activity.  Moreover, while the lobbying industry as a whole may be 
better funded in the US, this should perhaps lead to more coalition activity in the EU 
rather than less. Coalitions do not necessarily require dues from the members; they can 
also be more of a work sharing framework to erase redundancies. If there is a set of 
interest groups which share the same goal on an individual issue and who are resource-
poor, they could coordinate their efforts – divvying up MEPs to visit and tactics to 
pursue. Net lack of resources in the EU therefore does not seem to be the strongest 
explanation for the lack of coalition activity in the EU. I look at the role of resources 
more directly within the US and the EU under the interest group characteristics section 
below. 
  In sum, we see evidence that the democratic institutional design of a polity plays a 
role in coalition activity. Coalitions in any polity offer the potential to pool resources and 
thus there is an incentive to forge coalitions. However, there is an added incentive to 
forge coalitions in systems were policymakers are accountable to the public in direct 
elections, since those officials need to ensure the votes they take on individual policy   22
proposals are supported by large portions of the electorate. Ad hoc issue coalitions 
convey to elected officials the size and breadth of support for a proposal; and this may 
drive more coalition activity in the US than the EU. 
 
Issues 
The institutional structure within which an advocate is working is not, of course, the only 
consideration when deciding to join an issue coalition.  
[Table 1 here] 
As discussed in the theoretical section, previous scholarship has suggested that issues 
characterized by high conflict may lead advocates to band together. The findings show 
that indeed this is the case in the EU, where the highest percentage of advocates joining 
coalitions are doing so on issues that have opposing perspectives fighting against each 
other. In the US, however, the data is more ambiguous. Table 1 suggests advocates are 
most likely to join coalitions on issues that have a number of different perspectives, but 
not necessary in direct opposition to each other. These are issues where camps of 
advocates are promoting different ways to solve a political problem. It is important 
however to not over-interpret the finding since the number of observations is rather small 
for this category.  Issues characterized by no conflict differ from cases with numerous 
perspectives or directly opposing perspectives. On issues with some level of conflict or 
intense conflict, advocates have an incentive to ban together.   
  Regarding issue scope, there is a clear pattern among advocates in the US; as the 
scope of their issue increases, they are more likely to join a coalition. Twenty-one percent 
of advocates that join coalitions are active on issues that will only impact a small sector,   23
and 30% of joining advocates are active on those impacting large and multiple sectors, 
while 40% of advocates that decide to ally do so on the largest scope issues with system-
wide ramifications. There is no clear relationship in the EU system between issue scope 
and coalition activity.  
The other hypothesized relationship – that increasing public salience will lead to 
coalition membership – is also supported by the data but the effect only requires that 
there be some level of coverage of the issue in the news, there needn’t be hundreds of 
stories.  In both the US and the EU, coalition membership is most likely when there is 
some level (even low) of news coverage of the issue.  
  The findings suggest that conflict and salience do play a role in the decision to 
join a coalition, while issue scope is only influential in the US. However, factors at the 
advocate level also play a role. I turn to those now.  
 
Interests 
The expectations about organizational resources are not born out in the findings, as 
presented in Table 1. It is not the poorest organizations that need to pool resources and 
thus join coalitions, but rather it is the wealthier organizations that are engaging in this 
lobbying strategy.
3 This may be because resource-poor organizations do not feel they can 
spare funding to donate it to a coalition of organizations; or that coalition membership is 
more cost-intensive than scholars have realized – in time, money, and labor. The effort 
and energy expended hashing out a common position that is accepted by all coalition 
members could be saved if an organization decided to go it alone and were thus able to 
make the final call on all advocacy decisions.    24
  Turning to the second interest-group-level factor that was hypothesized to play a 
role in coalition membership, the type of actor does influence whether the advocate 
chooses to go it alone or band together with like-minded actors. The findings differ from 
expectations following from Clark and Wilson (1961) that ideological groups may be 
constrained from working with other organizations. In the US, citizen groups are the most 
likely to engage in coalition activities, with 50% of citizen group advocates reporting 
coalition activity compared to the average of 29%. The next most likely are trade 
associations, which report joining ad hoc coalitions at 42%. In the EU, trade associations 
are the type of advocate most commonly active in coalitions.  However, citizen groups 
are second most likely to engage in coalition activity and they are the only other actor 
type that reported doing so. Taken together, these findings suggest citizen groups in both 
the US and the EU have a tendency to ally, but that they must have some level of 
resources to foot the bill that coalition activity requires.  
Conclusion 
Understanding the decision to join a coalition requires contextual and interest group 
information. The institutional design of the system in which an advocate is operating is 
critical. Will policymakers respond to lobbying tactics aimed at signalling the support of 
large swaths of the electorate? If not, is there much sense in putting resources into 
coalition building and coordinating?  The data gathered from lobbyists in the US and the 
EU suggests the answer is no. The democratic accountability of policymakers appears to 
play a role in the decision to form and join coalitions.  
  However, we also saw evidence that the differences in the composition of the US 
and EU advocacy communities may also affect the propensity of EU groups to align,   25
since larger pan-European federations don’t see the same benefits as smaller specialized 
US groups.  
The democratic accountability of policymakers remains a strong explanation for 
the differences we find between the US and the EU. It must be noted that this is not to say 
that the U.S. system is an ideal type. On the contrary, direct elections in the U.S. lead to 
perverse imbalances of power. While American policymakers are very much driven by 
the re re-election motive, they are not driven to be equally responsive to all constituents. 
This is because direct elections in the U.S. are coupled with private financing of 
elections.  While it is always difficult to prove categorically, a great deal of evidence 
exists to suggest that policymakers are more responsive to wealthy interests that are able 
to aid in funding the re-election campaign. Lacking direct elections and thus financing of 
elections, the EU is free of such a biasing force. However, it can not be argued that the 
difference in institutional forms (elections versus appointment) lead to diverging 
motivational forces for US and EU policymakers and consequently to different advocacy 
strategies (coalition formation vs. networking) for advocates in the two polities.  
 Institutional  explanations  are only part of the story. Though coalition signals may 
be more useful in the US, they still are not ubiquitous. Likewise, coalitions are not totally 
absent from the EU scene. Issue characteristics also play a role; US advocates ally more 
often on issues with multiple viewpoints, with a larger societal impact and some level of 
salience. The same pattern is evident in the EU. Finally, the characteristics of the 
advocate themselves determine if they will work closely with other organizations in an ad 
hoc issue coalition. Different types of actors engage in coalition activity at varying levels. 
Importantly, citizen groups in both systems see an advantage is banning together and, in   26
the process, showing their solidarity and pooling their resources. Finally, coalition 
membership requires some threshold of resources in both polities, with advocates 
supported by medium and large offices more likely to engage in coalition activity. The 
data presented here on the influence of institutions, issues and interests on coalition 
activity has driven home the point: To understand the decision to ally or forge ahead 
alone we must look to the broader political context and the character of the advocate.    27
Figure 1. Coalition Activity in the US and the EU 
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Table 1. Coalition Membership by Issue & Interest Characteristics 
   US           EU    
Conflict Freq.  N       Freq.  N 
None   29% 21    None   6% 16 
Multiple P  67% 3   Multiple P  0% 7 
Opposing  27% 41    Opposing  12% 59 
          
Scope                N 
Small sector  22% 23    Small sector  8% 24 
Large Sector  32% 22    Large Sector  17% 23 
Multiple 
Sectors  30% 10   
Multiple 
Sectors  5% 19 
System-wide  40% 10    System-wide  6% 16 
          
Salience                N 
0 stories  33% 30    0 stories  9% 32 
1-5 stories  43% 14    1-2 stories  20% 20 
6-50 stories  9% 11    3 or more  3% 30 
51 or more  20% 10        
           
Total - N  19 65      8 82 
Total - percent  29%           10%   
           
           
   US           EU    
Staff Freq.  N       Freq. N 
1 to 5  29% 14    1 to 5  3% 30 
6 to 20  44% 18    6 to 20  16% 38 
21 or more  50% 14    21 or more  7% 14 
           
Total - N  19 46      8 82 
Total - percent  41%       10%  
             
Type     N          N 
Citizen  50% 10    Citizen  6% 16 
Foundation  38% 8   Foundation  0% 3 
Trade  42% 19    Trade  15% 46 
Corporations*  33% 9   Hired Firms*  0% 7 
Government  0% 19    Government  0% 10 
           
Total - N  19 65      8 82 
Total - percent  29%           10%   
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Notes: 
 
1 The US interviews were carried out in 2002 under the Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, 
Leech, and Kimball project -- Advocacy & Pubic Policymaking Project – NSF grants # 
SES-0111224 and SBR-9905195. The EU interviews were carried out during 2004-5 with 
the support of a Fulbright Fellowship. Analysis was supported by a Fellowship from the 
Pennsylvania State University. 
2 For a full description of the 47 issues please visit: http://www.personal.psu.edu/cxm548 
3 Note: Congressional advocates are left out of this analysis, thus it is run on an N of 46. 
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